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I. INTRODUCTION

Municipal "camping ordinances" typically regulate or prohibit
camping or sleeping in parks and other public areas.1 From a public
safety perspective, such statutes safeguard a locality's public spaces from
nocturnal criminal activity. 2 Under contrary views, camping ordinances
prohibit life-sustaining activities to redirect members of a city's
homeless population away from certain public areas.3
Irrespective of their legislative intent, camping ordinances raise
serious concerns about the constitutional rights of homeless and
shelterless citizens. 4 By proscribing the act of sleeping, city councils
jeopardize intentionally or incidentally homeless individuals' rights of
privacy, travel, and equal protection. 5 Constitutional challenges to anticamping legislation invoke the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as various judicial doctrines and precepts of
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1. See,
e.g.,
VANCOUVER
MUN.
CODE
§
8.22.040
(2002),
available
at
http://www.cityofvancouver.us/MunicipalCode.asp ("It shall be unlawful for any person to camp,
occupy camp facilities for purposes of habitation, or use camp paraphernalia in the following areas..
• : (1) any park; (2) any street; or (3) any publicly owned or maintained parking lot or other publicly
owned or maintained area .... )
2. See Andrew J. Liese, Note, We Can Do Better: Anti-Homeless Ordinances as Violations of State
Substantive Due ProcessLaw, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1413, 1421 (2006).
3. See Paul Ades, Comment, The Unconstitutionalityof "Antihomeless" Laws: Ordinances Prohibiting
Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CAL. L. REV. 595, 596
(1989); Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutionaland HistoricalAnalysis of Official Efforts to
Drive Homeless Personsfrom American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 647 (1992).
4. See Ades, supra note 3, at 596-97; Robert C. McConkey III, Comment, "Camping Ordinances" and
the Homeless: Constitutionaland Moral Issues Raised by Ordinances ProhibitingSleeping in Public
Areas, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 633, 637 (1996).
5. See Gregory Townsend, CardboardCastles: The FourthAmendment's Protectionof the Homeless's
Makeshift Shelters in PublicAreas, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 229 (1999) (citing People v. Thomas, 45
Cal. Rptr. 2d 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)); Ades, supranote 3, at 617.
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criminal and constitutional law. 6 Homeless plaintiffs have sought to
invalidate anti-sleeping and vagrancy laws on these grounds.7
Undergirding such constitutional challenges, questions remain: In what
ways would the invalidation of camping ordinances help solve the dual
problems of homelessness and poverty? Should public recreational areas
become de facto living spaces for the homeless? Lawyers advocating for
the homeless should not rely merely on constitutional arguments
challenging individual city ordinances. Rather, they should examine
legal challenges to anti-sleeping and camping legislation that will force
legislative solutions to the problem of homelessness. 8
This Article argues that Fourth Amendment challenges to camping
ordinances can prompt legislative efforts to solve the problem of
homelessness in U.S. cities. By properly employing the Supreme Court
of the United States' judicial standard for privacy rights, courts should
consider the efforts of individual cities' efforts to curb poverty when
asking the following question: does society view a homeless person's
expectation of privacy as reasonable?
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO "CAMPING ORDINANCES"

A. "Camping Ordinances" as Cruel and Unusual Punishment
1. Punishing Mere Status
The Eighth Amendment mandates that "cruel and unusual
punishments [shall not be] inflicted."9
Among the many judicial
doctrines resulting from this prohibition, the Supreme Court has held
that legislation punishing mere status is unconstitutional. 10 In Robinson,
the Court invalidated a California law criminalizing addiction to
narcotics regardless of whether the addict actually used narcotics or

6. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 349, 351, 358 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Pottinger v.
City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1571, 1576-77 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d

1145, 1164 (Cal. 1995).
7. See, e.g., Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 1975); Joyce v. City of San
Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 853 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
8. See McConkey, supranote 4, at 667.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

10. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).

committed other crimes associated with the addiction.11 According to
Robinson, statutes are unconstitutional when they punish status alone
and not the acts derivative of a person's status. 12 Courts later clarified
the definition of status under the Eighth Amendment as applied to
13
homeless individuals.
Courts rarely invalidate "camping ordinances" for being punitive of
status alone.1 4 Because camping and anti-sleeping laws do not mention
the homeless population, it is difficult to argue that such legislation
explicitly bans the very condition of being homeless. In Tobe, the city
of Santa Ana, California enacted an ordinance that banned "camping"
and storing personal property on public streets and other public areas. 5
The police strictly enforced the ordinance by confiscating makeshift
living materials, removing the homeless from public areas and missions,
and implementing a sweep against homeless residents in the city's civic
center.1 6 A group of Santa Ana taxpayers challenged the statute's
constitutionality to bar enforcement. 17 The California Court of Appeal
held that the ordinance criminalized the involuntary status of
homelessness and constituted "a transparent manifestation of Santa
Ana's policy.., to expel the homeless."1 8 Thus, the law's punitive
measure constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. 1 9 The Supreme Court of California reversed the decision,
however, and upheld the camping ordinance because it did not facially or
explicitly punish the mere status of homelessness. 20 The court rules that
trespassing, storing personal property in public areas, and camping were
all acts "derivative" of homelessness. 21
Tobe's distinction between
"status" and "acts derivative of status" not only relied on language in
Robinson,22 but also parroted lower court decisions rendered just one

11. Id., see also McConkey, supra note 4, at 641 (placing Robinson as the first in a line of cases
addressing criminalized status with respect to the Eighth Amendment).
12. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
13. See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000).

14. See McConkey, supranote 4, at 640-41.
15. Tobe, 892 P.2dat 1150-51.
16. Id. at 1151.

17. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145
(Cal. 1995).
18. Id. at 393,395.
19. Id. at 393.
20. Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1150.
21. Id. at 1166-67.

22. Id. at 1166 (citing Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664, 666).
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year earlier. 23 Needless to say, plaintiffs challenging camping ordinances
24
on Eighth Amendment grounds faced an uphill battle.
2. Involuntary Homelessness: Judicial Assessment of Legislative Efforts
While Robinson and Tobe stand for the proposition that a locality
may punish acts derivative of status, neither court addressed the more
difficult issue of whether cities can punish "involuntary [conduct] or
[conduct] occasioned by a compulsion. '25 A federal court in Florida
explored the notion of involuntary homelessness as constitutionally
unpunishable in Pottinger v. City of Miami.26

In Pottinger, homeless

plaintiffs challenged a Miami ordinance that made it "unlawful for any
person to sleep on any of the streets, sidewalks, public places or upon
the private property of another without the consent of the owner
thereof. '27 The court's treatment of the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment
claim is particularly instructive.
The court determined that the
plaintiffs, as homeless residents of Miami, were involuntarily compelled
to sleep in public. 28 Moreover, the very state of homelessness was
involuntary "due to various economic, physical or psychological factors
that are beyond the homeless individual's control. ' 29 Most importantly,
the Pottinger court examined Miami's past efforts to shelter its
homeless residents:
[T]he City does not have enough shelter to house
Miami's homeless residents. Consequently, the City
cannot argue persuasively that the homeless have made a
deliberate choice to live in public places or that their
decision to sleep in the park as opposed to some other
exposed place is a volitional act. .. .Avoiding public

23. See generally Joyce, 846 F. Supp. 843 (rejecting homeless plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment
challenge of a San Francisco ordinance that prohibited, among other activities, camping or sleeping in
public parks); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (upholding a public drunkenness statute
against an Eighth Amendment challenge and noting that "criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the
accused has committed some actus reus), rev'd on other grounds, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995). In
Tobe, the Santa Ana statute prohibited the actus reus of camping Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1150-51.
24. Id. at 1166-67 (citing Joyce, 846 F. Supp. 843 at 857).
25. Powell, 392 U.S. at 533.
26. 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
27. Id. at 1559-60 n.ll (citing MIAMI, FLA. CODE § 37-63 (1990) (current version at MIAMi, FLA.
CODE § 37-3 (2007), available at http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp).
28. Id. at 1563 ("[T]he record in the present case amply supports the plaintiffs' claim that their
homeless condition compels them to perform certain life-sustaining activities in public.").
29. Id.

places when engaging in this otherwise innocent conduct
is also impossible. As long as homeless plaintiffs do not
have a single place where they can lawfully be, the
challenged ordinances.., effectively

punish them for something for which they may not be
convicted under the Eighth Amendment-sleeping,
eating and other innocent conduct.30
After considering Miami's lack of available shelter space for the
homeless, the Pottinger court concluded that the city's camping
ordinance violated the Eighth Amendment by prohibiting innocent
conduct that was not a volitional act.31 In other words, the Miami
32
ordinance did not punish any actus reus, or act derivative of status.
Sleeping and living in public were not acts in the normal sense of the
word, but non-volitional conditions of necessity.33
It is critically important that the Pottingercourt considered the city's
lack of commitment to ending poverty and homelessness as a factor in
adjudicating the constitutionality of its laws.3 4 This judicial method
could motivate cities and localities to make greater efforts to solve their
problems of poverty legislatively, instead of simply criminalizing the
symptoms of homelessness. As discussed in Part III. C, infra, Eighth
Amendment challenges are not the only way courts have assessed
legislative efforts to end homelessness.3 5 Indeed, in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, at least one court has factored the local provision of
36
homeless shelters when applying governing Supreme Court precedent.
B. Equal Protection Challenges to Camping Ordinances
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
any state from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

30. Id. at 1564-65.

31. Id. at 1565.
32. See Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1166.
33. See Pottinger,810 F. Supp. at 1562.

34. See id. at 1564-65.
35. See discussion infra Part III. C.
36. See States v. Dias, 609 P.2d 637, 640 (Haw. 1980).
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protection of the laws." 37 In other words, all persons similarly situated
must be treated alike under the law.38 Despite this limitation on state
law, the Supreme Court of the United States has held "that legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by
'39
the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Camping ordinances should be construed as rationally related to the
legitimate state interests of public safety, crime prevention, and public
sanitation. If state or municipal legislation, however, discriminates on
the basis of a suspect classification, or infringes upon constitutionally
40
protected fundamental rights, then courts will apply strict scrutiny.
1. Suspect Class
A legal classification is suspect if it is "directed to a 'discrete and
insular minority.' ' 41 The Supreme Court, however, has consistently
held that classifications based on monetary wealth are neither suspect
nor subject to judicial strict scrutiny. 42 In that regard, poverty and
homelessness do not possess the attributes that generally warrant added
constitutional protection and are not suspect classes for equal protection
purposes. 43 As a class, the poor are not "saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
'44
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
Thus, laws that discriminate on the basis of homelessness or poverty
must only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest and are not
'45
required to be "suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
2. Fundamental Right to Travel
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the right of interstate

37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
39. Id. at 440.
40. See id.
41. Pottinger,810 F. Supp. at 1578 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)).
42. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977).
43. See id. at 471; Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269 n.36 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that
the homeless do not constitute a suspect class).
44. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
45. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.

travel as a fundamental right for equal protection purposes. 46 In
Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court held that any statute directly penalizing
the exercise of the right to travel from state to state should be
invalidated if it does not pass a heightened scrutiny standard. 47 Thus,
such laws are unconstitutional unless they are "suitably tailored to serve
a compelling state interest. '48 Accordingly, the Court in Edwards v.
California invalidated a state law that punished state residents for
bringing indigent persons within California borders. 49 Although Edwards
was ultimately decided on interstate commerce grounds, 0 Justice
Douglas' concurrence alternatively provided the rationale for preserving
the fundamental right to travel.5 1 Douglas reasoned that statutory
barriers to travel violated the right to migrate, stating that such laws
"would prevent a citizen because he was poor from seeking new horizons
in other states.15 2 The Supreme Court has since adopted this reasoning
at least once,53 though the Court has failed to address whether the
fundamental right to travel includes intrastate movement.
Because most homeless individuals do not have access to
transportation,5 4 a fundamental rights approach to challenging antisleeping ordinances is effective only if the right to travel includes
intrastate travel. Arguably, camping ordinances limit a homeless
individual's ability to travel within a state or locality by prohibiting lifesustaining activities in various parts of a city, rendering such areas offlimits. Such state impositions, however, do not implicate the right to
migrate referred to by Justice Douglas in Edwards. Not surprisingly,
only one judicial decision implied that the fundamental right to travel
covers intrastate activity. In King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing
Authority, a local government agency required that families reside in
Rochelle, New York for five years before they could apply for statesubsidized housing.55 The Second Circuit held that the regulation's
46. Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902-03 (1986); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
47. 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
48. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
49. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941).
50. Id.
51. See id. at 181 (Douglas, J., concurring).
52. Id. ("It might thus withhold from large segments of our people that mobility which is basic to any
guarantee of freedom of opportunity.").
53. See Ades, supra note 3, at 614 n.149 (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982) ("[The
right to travel] protect[s] persons against the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement.")).
54. Id. at 609.
55. 442 F.2d 646, 647 (2d Cir. 1971).
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durational residence requirement violated the plaintiffs' right to travel. 56
While some plaintiffs hailed from New York cities other than Rochelle,
other plaintiffs in King were new arrivals from North Carolina. 57 Thus,
it is difficult to determine whether the regulation was invalidated because
it abridged the right of New York residents to travel interstate, or
because the law's residency requirement inhibited lower-class out-of-state
residents from moving to New York. Even if we assume that the King
court subscribed to the former rationale, the case only stands for the
proposition that local law may not discourage intrastate travel between
cities. 58 Most camping ordinances could only be characterized as
limiting intrastate, intra-city travel.
The fundamental right to intrastate, intra-city travel is tenuous at
best and generally not recognized by courts. Arguments that camping
ordinances unconstitutionally limit a homeless resident's fundamental
right to move within a city, therefore, will likely fail.
C. Procedural Due Process: Vagueness
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
criminal statutes to be clear and precise enough to give potential
offenders fair notice of prohibited conduct.5 9 Accordingly, many
homeless plaintiffs have challenged camping and anti-sleeping
ordinances on the ground that they are unconstitutionally vague. For
example, in Kolender v. Lawson, the Supreme Court invalidated a
California statute that required loitering individuals to "account for
'60
[their] presence" and to produce "credible and reliable identification.
The Court agreed with the plaintiffs' arguments that the statutory
language was too vague to enforce predictably and affirmed the longstanding judicial standard for such laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 61 By requiring legislatures to define criminal statutes

56. Id. at 648.
57. Id. at 647.
58. Id. at 648.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."); see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1939)
(defining the void-for-vagueness doctrine in invalidating a state law that used imprecise statutory
terms such as "gangster").
60. 461 U.S. 352, 357, 361 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. at 357 ("[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited
and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.").

clearly and precisely, the Due Process Clause prevents excessive and
limitless enforcement of indefinite offenses. As the Kolender court
explained, a statute's clarity is held to an "ordinary intelligence"
standard. 62 Whether a potential offender knows exactly what type of
conduct the law prohibits is relatively unimportant and practically
impossible. 63 Rather, the Court recognized:

that the more important aspect of the vagueness
doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principal
element of the doctrine-the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement." Where the legislature fails to provide such
minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors,
'64
and juries to pursue their personal predilections.
Most courts have rejected void-for-vagueness claims as applied to
camping or anti-sleeping ordinances. For instance, in Tobe, plaintiffs
claimed that the Santa Ana ordinance's vague definitions of "camp" and
"camp paraphernalia," and its failure to define "temporary shelter,"
created ambiguity regarding what conduct was prohibited. 65 The court
dismissed this argument outright, observing that those terms did not
necessarily apply to the specific criminal conduct of which the
petitioners were accused. 66 In Joyce, homeless plaintiffs challenged a
San Francisco anti-sleeping ordinance stating that: "every person who
commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct...
lodg[ing] in any building, structure, vehicle, or place, whether public or
private, without the permission of the owner or person entitled to the
possession or in control thereof. '67 The plaintiffs specifically argued
that the words "lodg[ing] [in] public" were unconstitutionally vague,

62. See id. at 357. Potential offenders of loitering, camping, or vagrancy laws likely do not have
access to the statutory text ofa locality's ordinances. Thus, the Court concluded that theoretical notice
of the crimes proscribed and limitations on arbitrary enforcement would likely sustain a law against a
void-for-vagueness challenge.
63. Id. at 357-58.
64. Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574-75 (1974) (affirming vagueness doctrine
in voiding a state law that prohibited flag desecration)).
65. Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1160.
66. Id. Because the Tobe petition was brought by demurrer, the exact conduct of the accused had not
yet been determined. Id. Accordingly, the court declared the question of unconstitutional vagueness
premature. Id.
67. Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 862 n. 11 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(i)).
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encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement against homeless
persons. 68 The court rejected this position for two reasons: (1) the
ordinance was not "impermissibly vague in all of its applications," 69 and
(2) the City introduced evidence that the police enforced the statute
narrowly.70
Even if homeless plaintiffs could theoretically succeed in challenging
camping ordinances on vagueness, city councils could mitigate the
effects of such lawsuits by simply rewording the ordinances. Cities and
localities may alter with legislation to avoid constitutional hurdles.
Thus, homeless plaintiffs could face the problem of mootness or
experience years of litigation producing little result.
Other
constitutional challenges to camping ordinances provide clearer inroads
by which homeless plaintiffs can force legislative solutions to problems
associated with poverty.71
III.

FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO CAMPING ORDINANCES:

AN

UNEXPLORED OPTION

The Fourth Amendment mandates that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. '72 While some
courts characterize the amendment as conferring a general right to
privacy, the Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted this
constitutional text to protect "individual privacy against certain kinds
of governmental intrusion. [B]ut its protections go further, and often
have nothing to do with privacy at all."' 73 Federal, state, or local
statutes may be challenged or invalidated if they violate Fourth
Amendment rights on their face or in application. Thus, Fourth
Amendment challenges to anti-sleeping ordinances provide a unique

68. See id. at 862.
69. Id. (quoting Village of Hoffiman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495
(1982) (emphasis added)).
70. Id. at 862-63. The court cited a San Francisco police memorandum communicating to officers
that "the mere lying or sleeping on or in a bedroll of and in itself does not constitute a violation." Id. at
863.
71. Note, however, that in one recent decision, a Washington Superior Court judge invalidated a
Vancouver camping ordinance as constitutionally vague. The judge concluded that the statute's
failure to define "camping" created a "hammer for police to regulate homelessness."
THE
OREGONIAN, November 1, 2005.
72. U.S. CONST.amend. IV.
73. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).

opportunity to
Supreme Court's
solve problems
constitutionality

force legislative solutions.
Properly applied, the
standard in Katz should measure a locality's efforts to
of poverty and homelessness when determining the
of its anti-homeless legislation.

Municipal ordinances that sanction the destruction, removal, or
gathering of homeless residents' personal property or makeshift homes
constitute a "meaningful interference with [their] possessory interests in
that property. ' 74 Furthermore, "such seizures undoubtedly have more
than a 'de minimus impact' on the property interests of the homeless,"
whose makeshift residences are partially or completely destroyed by the

government intrusion. 75 The more difficult issue, however, is whether a
homeless person has a legitimate expectation of privacy when his
76
property is searched, seized, or destroyed in a public area.
A. Katz and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine
In Katz, the Supreme Court first recognized that Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures could extend
beyond traditional concepts of privacy. 77 The defendant was convicted
of transmitting wagering information in a telephone booth in violation
of a federal statute. 78 At trial, the Government introduced evidence of
the defendant's telephone conversations, which were recorded by an
electronic listening device that FBI agents attached to the booth. 79 The
defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the recordings were
obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 80
Avoiding the issue of
whether the telephone booth itself was a constitutionally protected
private area, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the Government had not violated the Fourth Amendment. 81 The FBI

74. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
75. Pottingerv. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. at 1571 (quoting Jacobsen,466 U.S. at 125).

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
389 U.S. at 350-53 (1967).
Id. at 348.
Id.
Id. at 349-50.
Id. at 348-49.

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

affected "no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the
defendant]. ' 82 Importantly, both the Government and defendant's
counsel still viewed the constitutional issue as whether a telephone booth
was a private area protected by the Fourth Amendment. 3
The Supreme Court wholly disagreed with this characterization of the
right to privacy.8 4 Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart noted that
the parties'
effort to decide whether or not a given area, viewed in
the abstract, is constitutionally protected deflects
attention from the problem presented by this case. For
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.85
The Court's conception of the Fourth Amendment placed the limits
of the right to privacy in the eye of the beholder. Thus, the Fourth
Amendment potentially protected public areas if a person sought to
preserve privacy within such places.Indeed, the Court concluded that
"[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. ' 86 Using this rationale,
the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the defendant's
Fourth Amendment right to privacy in a public telephone booth
prevented Government from admitting the recorded conversations at
trial. 87
The expansion of the right to privacy under Katz is considerable. In
fact, the Court concluded that the right to privacy was a misnomer for
the Fourth Amendment's protections, nothing that "the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to

82. Id. at 349 (quoting Katz, 369 F. 2d at 134).
83. See id. at351.
84. Id. at 350.
85. Id. at 351 (emphasis added). Justice Stewart acknowledged that, in prior decisions, the Court
discussed the Fourth Amendment in terms of constitutionally protected areas, but that the Court "never
suggested that [the] concept [could] serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment
problem." Id. at 351 n.9.
86. Id. at 359.
87. See id.

privacy."' 88
Although the majority never explained how Fourth
Amendment protections could extend to matters totally unrelated to
privacy, Justice Harlan's concurrence may give some indication. 89
Justice Harlan solidifies the majority's eye of the beholder concept and
formulates a two-pronged constitutional test based upon a person's
subjective expectation of privacy:
[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, and statements that he exposes to the
plain view of outsiders are not protected because no intention to keep
them to himself has been exhibited.90
Justice Harlan's concurrence has become a prevailing standard in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 91 although it failed to address several
issues in the test's application. Courts were left with little guidance on
the following questions: should society be defined locally or federally?
Does a society-approved reasonable expectation of privacy protect
activities even if they are in plain view? And perhaps most importantly,
how do courts evaluate whether a society has accepted an expectation of
privacy as reasonable? In other words, how does a society manifest its
recognition, or lack thereof, of individual expectations regarding the
right to privacy?
B. Post-Katz: Legal Right to Occupy vs. Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy
In the years following Katz, courts applied Justice Harlan's twopronged test in cases where individuals asserted privacy rights in public
places. In doing so, they were forced to classify certain expectations of
privacy as reasonable or unreasonable in light of society's recognition
thereof. These cases begin to answer the question of how courts
appraise society's endorsement of an individual's expectation of
privacy.

88. Id. at 350.
89. See id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 141, 143 (1978); Amezquita v. Colon, 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir.
1975); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Unknown Agents of the U.S. Marshals Serv., 791 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1992); State v. Cleator, 857 P.2d 306 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
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1. Expectations of Privacy in Public Areas
Lower courts first extended Fourth Amendment protection to public
areas such as dressing rooms and bathroom stalls in State v. McDaniel
and Kroehler v. Scott, respectively. 92 These decisions, however, shed
little light on the function of Justice Harlan's second prong. The court
in McDaniel held that
the defendant-shoplifters
"had a
reasonableexpectation of privacy or freedom from intrusion under the
constitutional prohibitions of unreasonable searches" under the Fourth
Amendment. 93 The court did not examine whether society viewed that
expectation as reasonable. While the pervasive existence of private
dressing rooms in retail stores suggests that society views an expectation
of privacy therein as reasonable, the court never undertook such an
analysis. In Kroehler, the court found that a defendant's expectation of
privacy in a bathroom stall was reasonable; the private activity typically
associated with a bathroom generated that expectation. 94 The opinion,
however, never explicitly analyzed Katz's second-prong; the court never
mentioned society's recognition of expectations of privacy.
Perhaps the courts in McDaniel and Kroehler never applied Katz's
second prong because bathrooms and dressing rooms obviously created a
widely accepted expectation of privacy. Katz's second prong became
critically important, however, when courts began to apply a Fourth
Amendment analysis to cases in which homeless defendants challenged
unreasonable searches and seizures of their makeshift living spaces.
Cases involving temporary houses, boxes, or shacks on public property
raised questions and provoked assumptions about Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence: could an individual have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a makeshift home on public land? In dicta, Katz undeniably
affirmed the long-standing principle that an individual's expectation of
privacy was reasonable if he or she was "at home," but did not
extensively define this concept. 91

92. Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1117 (E.D. Pa. 1975); State v. McDaniel, 337 N.E.2d 173,
176, 178 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). See Gregory Townsend, CardboardCastles: The FourthAmendment's
Protectionof the Homeless's Makeshift Shelters in Public Areas, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 227 (1999).
93. McDaniel,337 N.E.2d at 178.
94. See Kroehler,391 F. Supp. at 118 n.4.
95. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. Note that an individual's expectation of privacy at home may not be
reasonable if he knowingly exposes himself to the public while in his home. For example, if a
homeowner shouted his confession from his open front doorway, the right to privacy may not protect
such an admission. See id. at 351 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1966)). Still,
"the home is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections." Lewis, 385 U.S. at 211.

Whether Fourth Amendment protection could extend to makeshift
homes required a more rigorous examination of the Katz test. A
homeless litigant could easily satisfy the first prong; any homeless
individual could assert a subjective expectation of privacy in a self-built
structure used as living space. Justice Harlan's second prong, however,
raised problematic concerns.
Whether society viewed a homeless
person's expectation of privacy in a makeshift home on public property
as reasonable, legal, or socially desirable raised contentious issues in the
dual problems of homelessness and poverty.
2. Illegal Occupation Theory
Several courts have treated homeless defendants' lack of legal rights
to occupy public or private property as dispositive in denying their
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. In those cases, local
trespassing laws often operate to render a homeless individual's
expectation of privacy unreasonable. In Amezquita v. HernandezColon, the Land Authority of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
attempted to evict squatters from government land. 96 When the
eviction effort failed, the Authority and several police officers used
bulldozers to destroy makeshift structures erected by the squatters. 97
The squatters obtained a preliminary injunction to stop the destructive
action, arguing that the razing of their makeshift homes constituted a
governmental intrusion in violation of their right to be free from illegal
searches and seizures. 98 On appeal, however, the court rejected the
squatters' claim outright, holding that they possessed no objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy because they enjoyed no legal right to
occupy the land:
Nothing in the record suggests that the squatters' entry upon the land
was sanctioned in any way by the Commonwealth. The plaintiffs knew
they had no colorable claim to occupy the land; in fact, they had been
asked twice by Commonwealth officials to depart voluntarily. That fact
alone makes ludicrous any claim that they had a reasonable expectation
of privacy... Where the [squatters] had no legal right to occupy the land
and build structures on it, [these actions] could give rise to no reasonable
expectation of privacy. The conduct in which they have engaged is

96. 518 F.2d 8, 9 (1stCir. 1975).
97. Id.
98. See id. at 10.
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criminal under Puerto Rico law. 99
Puerto Rican criminal law expressly forbade trespassing and building
structures on public or private property. 100 According to the court,
erecting and living in structures without the permission of the
government could not give rise to an expectation of privacy that
society views as reasonable. 10 1 The legal right to occupy a living space
was necessary to trigger Fourth Amendment rights.
Because the squatters lacked a legal right to occupy the government
land, the court viewed the fact that the structures were built as homes as
immaterial.
Acknowledging that "[w]ithout question, the home is
accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections," the court
distinguished between legal residences and makeshift homes constructed
in contravention to local law. 102 "[W]hether a place constitutes a
person's 'home' for [Fourth Amendment] purpose[s] cannot be decided
without any attention to its location or the means by which it was
acquired; that is, whether the occupancy and construction were in bad
faith is highly relevant. ' 10 3 Thus, Amezquita stands for the proposition
that, applying the language of Katz, a homeless individual's expectation
of freedom from governmental intrusion is unreasonable when he lives
in a makeshift home on private or public property. Although the court
never explicitly mentions society in connection with privacy rights,
Amezquita implicitly demonstrates that a statute, as a legislated
reflection of the people's will, may serve as evidence of society's
recognition-or lack thereof-of certain expectations of privacy. In a
sense, the court in Amezquita did apply Katz's second prong, even if
subtextually.
Some cases have reached similar outcomes by applying different
Fourth Amendment principles. In United States v. Ruckman, the Tenth
Circuit held that a spelunker who lived in a natural cave for eight
months had no reasonable expectation of privacy, since he was a
trespasser on federal lands. 10 4 The rationale underlying the decision,
however, sharply contrasted with that of Amezquita; the court decided
the case on seemingly narrow grounds.
Rather than finding the

99. Id. at 11-13.
100. Id. at 13 (citing 33 L.P.R.A. § 1442 (1972)).
101. Id. at 11.
102. Id. at 12 (citing Lewis 385 U.S. at 211).
103. Id.
104. 806 F.2d 1471, 1472 (10th Cir. 1986).

spelunker's lack of a possessory right to the cave dispositive, the court
examined whether the cave could be characterized as Ruckman's
residence. 105 Indeed, the court found the fact that Ruckman's counsel
described him as "just camping out there for an extended period of time"
persuasive. 10 6 The majority further concluded: "[T]he issue is whether
the cave comes within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable searches of 'houses."' 107
It is critically
important that the majority tied the right to privacy to the house rather
than to the spelunker's expectation of privacy. The court did not hold
that society failed to recognize his expectation of privacy in a cave as
reasonable. Rather, the court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment did
not protect him against searches and seizures because his conception of
the cave as his house was unjustified.108 Presumably, if he had justifiably
viewed the cave as his house, the court would have upheld his rights of
privacy. This shift in judicial approach, even if a legal outlier, provides
an opening in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for homeless litigants.
Under

Ruckman, a homeless individual could potentially prevent governmental
intrusion upon his makeshift living space if he demonstrated that it
served as his actual house.
Admittedly, the spelunker's lack of possessory rights to the land was
not irrelevant in Ruckman.
The dissent however, gave the issue
comprehensive treatment. The majority simply noted that his actions
were in violation of trespassing laws. 10 9 The dissent clearly indicted the
rule advanced in Amezquita: the lack of a legal right to occupy
necessarily deprives an individual of Fourth Amendment privacy
rights. 110 The dissent argued that search and seizure jurisprudence is not
concerned with notions of property ownership and possession: "[T]he
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy
rather than property, and [we] have increasingly discarded fictional and
procedural barriers rested on property concepts."11' 1 Reminding the

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1474.
Id. at 1473 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1472 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1473-74.
Id.
See, supranote 99 and accompanying text.
Id. at 1477 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
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majority of the Supreme Court's language in Katz, the dissent concluded
that unlawful possession of an area does not automatically render
defendants subject to warrantless searches and seizures.112 An inquiry
into the defendant's reasonable expectations must be undertaken:
Katz held that capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but
upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. In other
words, failing to have a legal property right in the invaded place does
not, ipso facto, mean that no legitimate expectation of privacy can
11 3
attach to that place.
Despite the dissent's forceful reminder of Supreme Court precedent
and Fourth Amendment principles, modern case law generally subscribes
to a pure illegal occupation theory.11 4 Indeed, such cases uphold the
notion that Fourth Amendment rights are at their lowest ebb when an
individual violates the law, even if the violation is concomitant with
homeless status. For example, in the California case People v. Thomas a
homeless defendant challenged the constitutionality of a police search of
115
his cardboard box, which had been prepared as a living space.
Applying the two-pronged test from Katz, the California Court of
Appeals implicitly conceded that the defendant had a subjective
11 6
expectation of privacy while living in a makeshift cardboard home.
The court however, held that such an expectation was not objectively
reasonable-or recognized by society as reasonable-because the
defendant had no legal authority to live on the public property in
question. 7 The court stated: "Where, as here, an individual 'resides' in
a temporary shelter on public property without a permit or permission
and in violation of a law which expressly prohibits what he is doing, he
does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy."118

112. See Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1477 (McKay, J., dissenting).
113. Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)).
114. But see State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 153-54 (1991) ("[F]actors such as whether the
defendant was a trespasser and whether the place involved was public 'are, of course, relevant as
helpful guides, but should not be taken mechanistically. They are not ends in themselves; they merely
aid in evaluating the ultimate question in all fourth amendment cases-whether the defendant had a
legitimate expectation of privacy, in the eyes of our society, in the area searched."') (quoting
Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1476 (McKay, J., dissenting)).
115. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 610, 611-12 (1995).
116. See id. at 612-13 (Focusing the entire holding on the objective expectation of privacy).
117. Id. (Defendant's temporary residence violated the Los Angeles Municipal Code).
118. Id. at613.

Beyond simply stating the illegal occupation theory espoused in
Amezquita, the court did not explain its underlying rationale. The court
did not examine whether the law was widely enforced or whether society
stood so firmly behind its trespassing ordinances that a homeless
trespasser could not reasonably expect privacy while residing in his
cardboard box.
Despite the scant constitutional explanation in Thomas and the
irregularities of the Ruckman opinion, the above cases stand for the
proposition that, under Katz's second prong, society does not recognize
expectations of privacy that contradict local property or trespassing
laws as reasonable. When a locality legally prohibits occupation of a
particular space, courts generally find that a homeless individual's
expectation of privacy in a structure erected on such space is objectively
unreasonable and therefore unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. 119
3. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Homeless Shelters
Some courts have shed light on privacy rights questions for the
trespassing homeless, or street-homeless, by distinguishing such legal
claims from those of shelter residents. Indeed, the same constitutional
arguments advanced to protect shelter residents against unreasonable
searches and seizures can be employed to give privacy rights to the
street-homeless. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Unknown
Agents of the U.S. Marshal Services, ten to twenty federal marshals
raided a Washington, D.C. emergency overnight homeless shelter, woke
up nearly 500 sleeping homeless residents (many at gunpoint), and
checked each resident against a photograph of a suspected fugitive. 120 A
class of homeless plaintiffs brought suit for injunctive relief from such
conduct in the future.1 21 Recognizing the "necessity that the rights
secured by our Constitution apply with equal force to this growing
[homeless population]," the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia held that people who stay at homeless shelters enjoy the
freedom from unreasonable government intrusions as granted by the
Fourth Amendment.1 22 Needless to say, the court failed to address
related issues, such as whether a homeless person forfeits privacy rights
when he voluntarily or involuntarily leaves the shelter.

119. See, supranotes 114-18 and accompanying text.
120. 791 F. Supp.1, 3-4 (D.O.C. 1992). [Hereinafter CCNV].
121. Id. at 2, 5.
122. Id. at 5.
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In applying the second prong of Justice Harlan's test in Katz, the
CCNV court characterized shelter residents' expectations of privacy as
objectively reasonable because, "the shelter was, for them, the most
private place they could possibly have gone-the place most akin to
their 'home'." 123 Importantly, the court anchored this characterization
with a public policy concern:
[The] expectation of privacy [in a shelter] is a
reasonable one. To reject this notion would be to read
millions of homeless citizens out of the text of the
Fourth Amendment... Thus, the Constitution does not
contemplate a society in which millions of citizens have
no place where they can go in order to avail themselves
of the protections
provided by the Fourth
124
Amendment.
Although the holding is limited to shelter residents, the court's
concern that homeless citizens could potentially be read out of the
Fourth Amendment applies to the street-homeless as well. 125 Although
the privacy rights of individuals residing in homeless shelters are largely
uncontested, the judicial reasoning in CCNV should be extended to grant
the street-homeless Fourth Amendment protection.
C. Katz's Second Prong Revisited: The Government Acquiescence
Doctrine
Most courts have not carefully considered whether society views a
street-homeless citizen's expectation of privacy and freedom from
warrantless searches as reasonable. Many courts immediately dispose of
Katz's second prong by employing the following reasoning: a society
that chooses to legally prohibit trespassing on private property must not
view a trespasser's expectation of privacy as reasonable. 126 At least one
court, however, found this logical step too simplistic for a proper
application of Fourth Amendments rights to homeless citizens.
In State v. Dias, the Supreme Court of Hawaii evaluated society's view
of reasonable expectations of privacy in light of additional
considerations.
Most importantly, the court considered a local
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 6.
Id.
See discussion infra Part II.
See, supranotes 114-18 and accompanying text.

government's acquiescence to the homeless trespasser's presence in its
judicial calculus. 127 A group of homeless citizens established a makeshift
residence in a structure built on stilts in an area of Hawaii known as
"Squatters' Row. ' 128 Squatters' Row was situated on Sand Island,
property exclusively owned by the State. 129 Thus, the homeless citizens
lived in makeshift shelters in violation of Hawai'i law. 130 Upon hearing
spoken words associated with gambling near the shelter, a police officer
entered without prior announcement and arrested the homeless
defendants on gambling charges. 31
The defendants challenged the
constitutionality of the search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
arguing that they possessed a subjectively and objectively reasonable
132
expectation of privacy in Squatters' Row.
The court first acknowledged that, under Katz's second prong,
homeless defendants could be foreclosed from asserting privacy claims
under the Fourth Amendment when society viewed their expectation of
privacy as unreasonable.1 33 In the facts at bar however, the lack of a
legal right to occupy Squatters' Row under Hawai'i law was not
dispositive. Rather, the court took a hard, careful look at extrastatutory evidence when evaluating whether society viewed an
expectation of privacy as reasonable. Specifically, the court examined
whether Hawai'i's prohibition of squatters was actually or frequently
enforced:
[W]e have taken judicial notice of the fact that 'Squatters' Row' on
Sand Island has been allowed to exist by sufferance of the State for a
considerable period of time. And although no tenancy under property
concepts was thereby created, we think that this long acquiescence by
the government has given rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy on
the part of the defendants.... This, we think, is consistent not only with
134
reason but also with our traditional notions of fair play and justice.
Despite the fact that the homeless squatters possessed no legal right
to their living space-that they occupied the space in direct
contravention to Hawai'i law-the court held that society must have
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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viewed expectations of privacy in Squatters' Row as reasonable because
it tacitly allowed the area to exist as a makeshift neighborhood.1 35
Thus, Fourth Amendment rights should apply wherever the government
or society implicitly allows its citizens to establish residency. This
reasoning is consistent with traditional principles in Fourth Amendment
136
jurisprudence that rights of privacy extend to houses.
IV. CONCLUSION
Illegal occupation theory is problematic for both constitutional and
public policy reasons. The Supreme Court has long interpreted the
Fourth Amendment to protect "people, not places. 1' 37 Conceptions of
property ownership should not operate to defeat a fundamental right
granted to individuals; privacy rights are "right[s] of the people to be
secure in their persons [and] houses... against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 1' 38 Local conceptions of property law and trespassing should
not be wholly irrelevant. Rather, such factors should be weighed against
the well-established notion that privacy rights attach to the individual
regardless of where she resides. As Justice McKay observed in his dissent
in Ruckman, whether the party asserting the privacy right was a
trespasser and whether the place was public "are, of course, relevant...
guides, but should not be undertaken mechanistically."1 39 These factors
merely aid courts in answering the fundamental constitutional questions
they are required to address under Katz: "whether the defendant had a
legitimate expectation of privacy, in the eyes of our society, in the area
'140
searched.
In conducting this inquiry, most courts have erroneously assumed that
the eyes of society are reflected by its laws alone. For example, the
court in Amezquita found that Puerto Rico's criminal trespassing laws
proved that society viewed its homeless citizens as undeserving of
privacy in public areas. 141 Similarly, the court in Thomas found that a
Los Angeles criminal law proved that society viewed its homeless
citizens did not deserve the fundamental right of privacy while

135. See id.
136. See Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1472.

137. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
138. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
139. Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1476 (McKay, J., dissenting).

140. Id.
141. See Amezquita, 518 F.2d 8, 11-12 (lst Cir. 1975).

trespassing on public or private property. 142 These hasty conclusions do
not strike at the real inquiry posed by Katz-an examination of society's
view, not simply a cursory glance at the face of an enacted statute. In
fact, the degree to which a law is enforced would seem like a more
accurate barometer of society's sentiment toward the restriction.
Any true analysis of society's views on expectations of privacy is
complicated and multi-faceted. Any inquiry should include a multitude
of extra-textual factors, including public statements by city officials,
enforcement of local statutes, and the municipal government's
acquiescence of failure to enforce local statutes. In Dias, despite the
fact that Squatters' Row was technically an illegal settlement, the
Hawai'i government's acquiescence to the problem of homelessnessthe fact that they had not provided enough shelter space for the
homeless-was a dispositive indicator that a homeless person's
expectation of privacy in Squatters' Row had been viewed by society as
reasonable for years. 143 Homeless individuals must have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in areas where society forces them to live; a
locality's lack of shelter space amounts to a tacit acceptance of such
expectations as reasonable.
If courts factored a city's shelter space when applying Katz's second
prong, camping ordinances in virtually every major city would be
invalidated. In 2005, 32% of emergency shelter requests by homeless
families went unmet; 88% of cities surveyed turned away homeless
families from shelters due to a lack of resources. 144 Thus, establishing a
living space on the streets is frequently a homeless individual's only
option. Just as the court in CCNV characterized homeless shelters to
uphold Fourth Amendment rights, the streets are "the most private
place they could possibly [go]. ' 145 Indeed, in a city where homeless
shelters are scant or nonexistent, homeless "citizens have no place
where they can go to avail themselves of the protections provided by
1 46
the Fourth Amendment."
City councils and local governments must begin to take the difficult
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legislative steps toward ending poverty and homelessness. When faced
with the constitutional failure of quick-fix, cleansing mechanisms such as
camping and anti-sleeping statutes, legislatures will be motivated to take
thorough steps to cure the problems of poverty. Otherwise they will
face an electorate discontent with the criminal problems, aesthetic
unpleasantries, and moral inequities associated with homelessness.
Proper judicial adherence to Katz and application of Fourth Amendment
principles should render camping ordinances unconstitutional,
motivating local governments to begin this essential effort.
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